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EVALUATION OF THE CREW - COMMAND M O W I X  
POSTUNDING I.P?XRFACE 
By Harold J. Clancy 
SUMMARY 
Three separate  t e s t  s e r i e s  were used t o  evaluate the  postlanding in- 
(1) postlanding-systems t e r f a c e  between the  crew and t h e  command module: 
qua l i f i ca t ion  t e s t s ,  ( 2 )  water-egress-procedures developmental tes ts ,  
and (3) flight-crew water-egress t r a i n i n g .  These t e s t s  permitted in- 
vest igat ion of a l l  crew and command module postlanding-interface areas  
which inc1 uded systems , crew equipment, stowage, and egress.  
Crew capab i l i t y  t o  detect  uprighting system failures and i n  most 
C r e w  r epos i t i on ,  t o  cases,  t o  take remedial act ion w a s  demonstrated. 
e f f e c t  a spacecraft  uprighting, w a s  shown t o  be safe and e f f e c t i v e .  
Further t e s t i n g  i s  indicated t o  determine t h e  reasons f o r  uprighting 
compressor noise-level changes and t o  determine t h e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  of 
maintaining only t h e  lower noise l e v e l  during uprighting f o r  reasons 
of crew comfort. 
The Block I1 forward u n i f i e c  hatch was demonstrated t o  be capable 
of permitt ing a Stable I1 egress.  This l i f t e d  a f l i g h t  constraint  
from t h e  Apollo 8 mission. 
The postlanding ven t i l a t ion  system performed adequately durilig t h e  
high-humidi%y in-tank tes t  with command module OO7A. 
recent addi t ion of a couch-strut lockout device compresses t h e  air- 
flow duct. Further t e s t i n g  i s  indicated t o  determine i f  a i r  flow i s  
appreciably compromised. 
However, t h e  
Spacecraft Stable  I1 a t t i t u d e  photographs with one-bag i n f l a t i o n s  
' indicate  t h a t  a s ide  crew-hatch egress may be f e a s i b l e  for  a s ing le  
y-bag i n f l a t i o n .  Single z-bag-side crew-hatch Stable  I1 egresses a r e  
not recommended because the  hatch is p a r t i a l l y  under water, and imme- 
d i a t e  flooding would r e s u l t  i f  t h e  hatch was opened. 
Night egress was demonstrated t o  be f eas ib l e  f o r  both t h e  Stable  I 
and Stable I1 a t t i t u d e s  i f  f l i g h t  penl ights  a r e  avai lable .  Further 
t e s t i n g  i s  indicated t o  determine i f  t h e  new cyc l i c  couch-strut lockout 
devices i n t e r f e r e  with a Stable  I egress .  
INTHGDUCTION 
To evaluate t h e  t o t a l  crew and command module postlanding i n t e r -  
face and t o  permit f l i g h t  crews t o  gain valuable operat ional  experience 
with postlanding hardware, a s e r i e s  of tests w a s  defined which encom- 
passed the  postlanding-systems q u a l i f i c a t i o n  tes t s ,  water-egress- 
procedures developmental t e s t s ,  and fl ight-crew water-egress t r a i n i n g  
( f i g .  1). 
Postlanding-systems qua l i f i ca t ion  tests were conducted i n  command 
module 007A. 
period i n  which t h e  spacecraf t  f l oa t ed  f r e e l y  at sea.  Crewmen on t h i s  
test  were astronauts  J i m  Love11 , Commander; S tua r t  Roosa, Commaad 
Module P i l o t ;  and Charles Duke, Lunar Module P i l o t .  Although t h i s  tes t  
qua l i f i ed  spacecraf t  postlanding systems, it a l s o  provided a means o f  
evaluating t h e  postlanding in t e r f ace  between t h e  crew and t h e  command 
module f o r  a 48-hour postlanding period. 
The major port ion of t h e  tes ts  consisted of a 48-hour 
In t h e  water-egress-procedures developmental tes ts ,  t he  water- 
egress f l i g h t  check l i s t  was reviewed, updated, and performed by using 
t h e  t r a i n i n g  b o i l e r p l a t e  1102A and by using t e s t  subjects  from the  
Flight Crew Support Division. These tes t s  presented a means of eval- 
uating t h e  a b i l i t y  of t h e  Block I1 command module t o  f a c i l i t a t e  a sa fe  
and rapid egress  f o r  any postlanding contingency. Per t inent  d e t a i l s  
taken i n t o  account included loose equipment stowage, acqu i s i t i on  and 
deployment of su rv iva l  gear ,  and proper handling of spacecraft  hatches. 
This t e s t  s e r i e s  a l s o  included an invest igat ion of crew reposi t ion as 
a method of e f f e c t i n g  an uprighting i n  t h e  case of a one-beg failure. 
Test object ives  incorporated t h e  determination of crew procedures and 
the  evaluation of crew vu lne rab i l i t y  t o  in ju ry  i n  executing these  
procedures. 
Flight-crew water-egress t r a i n i n g  i s  composed of 2 days of t e s t i n g  
f o r  each jrimary and backup crew on any designated miesion. 
day includes b r i e f ings  t o  t h e  f l i g h t  crew on postlanding systems, 
hardware, and procedures. These b r i e f ings  a r e  followed by two fresh- 
water t r a i n i n g  exe rc i se s ,  including both Stable  I and Stable  I1 egresses.  
Also , ?osA landing procedures are performed i n  the  egress- t ra ining 
b o i l e r p l a t e  1102A. The second day i s  spent at  sea  i n  t h e  Gulf of 
Mexico, where postlanding procedures and egress procedures are oper- 
a t iona l ly  performed. 
and procedures ( f i g .  2). 
The f i r s 3  
C r e w  debrief ings provide information on hardware 
3 
TEST VEHICLES AND FACILITIES 
Command module OO7A - b u i l t  by North American Rockwell - contains 
a l l  Block I1 spacecraf t  postlanding systems. 
t e s t ,  t h i s  vehicle  was i n  t h e  command module 101 configuration with t h e  
following weight and center  of g rav i ty :  t h e  weight = 11 779 pounds and 
x = 38.41, y = 0.27, and z = 4.79. 
module OO7A included t h e  uprighting s y s t e s ,  t h e  postlanding v e n t i l a t i o n  
system, spacecraf t  recovery aids (very high frequency (vhf') recovery 
beacon, f lashing l i g h t ,  sea dye, grappling hook, su rv iva l  r ad io ,  and 
swimmer interphone) ,  vhf /amplitude modulation ( A M )  communications, and 
su rv iva l  equipment. 
During t h e  48-hour sea 
The systems and equipment on command 
- 
Boilerplate  1102A, b u i l t  by t h e  Landing and Recovery Division at 
the  Manned Spacecraft Center, contains a l l  Block I1 postlanding systems. 
These systems closely represent  t h e  a c t u a l  spacecraf t  -audib ly ,  
v i s u a l l y ,  and t a c t u a l l y .  The crew compartment includes fl ight-i tem- 
emergency oxygen and repressurizat ion system mockup; pressure-garment- 
assembly stowage bag; f l ight- type oxygen umbilicals ; postlanding l i g h t s ,  
switches, and c i r c u i t  breakers;  main display console with dummy switches,  
switch guards, and o the r  protrusions;  and Block I1 steam-vent duct 
mockup. Stowable items i n  t h e  b o i l e r p l a t e  included a f l i g h t  t o o l k i t ,  
t h e  postlaxiding v e n t i l a t i o n  ducts ,  a grappling hook, and t h e  f l i g h t -  
configured su rv iva l  k i t  s. 
uni t ized couches; stowage areas A89 u3, R4, B3, B 6 9  Azl and B7; 
The b o i l e r p l a t e  hatches simulate t h e  hatches f o r  command module 101, 
both i n  operation and i n  appearance. The s i d e  crew hatch i s  operated 
by using a hydraulic gearbox with s e l e c t o r  pawls f o r  l a t ch ing  and un- 
la tching.  A pressure-actuated counterbalance system a ids  i n  hatch 
operation. Forward hatches are s i m i l a r  i n  weight t o  f l i g h t  items. 
Actuation torque values werz adjusted on t h e  forward hatches t o  match 
those of command module 101. 
was used f o r  command module 101 post- tes ts .  
A f l ight-configured forward un i f i ed  hatch 
The b o i l e r p l a t e  contains an uprighting system similar i n  operation 
t o  t h e  f l i g h t  a r t i c l e  but which uses tanks of compressed air  r a t h e r  than 
a compressor. 
obtain spacecraf t  uprighting t i m e .  
c a l l y  duplicated by two motor noisemakers. 
The airf low t o  t h e  uprighting bags i s  adjustable  t o  
Spacecraft compressors are acousti-  
Boi lerplate  1102A w a s  configured t o  t h e  following weight and center  
of gravi ty:  
z = 4.1.  
s l i g h t l y  d i f f e ren t  from those of a command module, t hese  values were 
obtained by matching t h e  b o i l e r p l a t e  uprightings t o  t h e  command module; 
t h e  weight = 11 740 pounds and x = 39.3, y = 0.1, and 
Because uprighting c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of b o i l e r p l a t e  1102A are 
4 
thus ,  t h e  values are s l i g h t l y  d i f f e ren t  from those of command madule 101. 
The Stable  I1 f l o t a t i o n  a t t i t u d e  of bo i l e rp l a t e  1102A i s  shown i n  
f igure  3. 
Water Tank F a c i l i t y  
A fresh-water t a n k  i s  loca ted  i n  bui lding 260 at t h e  Manned Space- 
c r a f t  Center. The tank is 16 feet i n  depth and 24 feet  i n  diameter. 
Motor Vessel "Retriever" 
The "Retriever" i s  a converted landing c r a f t  u t i l i t y  (LCU) which 
was modified f o r  use as an open-sea t e s t  f a c i l i t y .  It includes a 
boom crane capable o f  placing t e s t  vehicles  i n t o  t h e  water and re- 
t r i ev ing  them. 
DESCRIPTION OF TESTS AND RESULTS 
Uprighting 
Nominal.- Two s t ab le  water a t t i t u d e s  a r e  concomitant with t h e  pres- 
ent  loca t ion  of t he  center  of g rav i ty  of an Apollo command module. 
are Stable  I with t h e  apex up and Stab le  I1 with t h e  apex down. 
apex-down a t t i t u d e  i s  undesirable because o f  a lack of ven t i l a t ion  and 
a safe-egress capabi l i ty ;  t hus ,  bringing t h e  spacecraft  from t h e  apex- 
down a t t i t u d e  t o  an apex-up a t t i t u d e  and maintaining it i n  t h i s  upright  
a t t i t u d e  i s  an important pa r t  of  t h e  postlanding period. 
uprighting system includes two 43-inch-diameter bags and one 34-inch- 
diameter bag loca ted  on t h e  upper deck, t h ree  bag solenoid switches,  
three bag solenoid c i r c u i t  breakers ,  two a i r  compressors, and two 
compresscr c i r c u i t  breakers.  
These 
The 
The spacecraf t  
The Apollo postlanding-systems qua l i f i ca t ion  tes t  w i t h  command 
module OO7A included a normal three-bag upright ing a t  sea and severa l  
failure-mode (two bags ) uprightings i n  t h e  calm-water t e s t  f a c i l i t y .  
These t e s t s  demonstrated t h e  capab i l i t y  of t h e  crew t o  de tec t  f a i l u r e s  
i n  t h e  system. The crewmembers can r ead i ly  determine when a bag has 
f a i l ed .  The side-window mirrors  allow v i s i b i l i t y  of t h e  l e r t  or r i g h t  
bag approximately 2 minutes a f t e r  it has begun t o  i n f l a t e .  Without 
using t h e  mirrors ,  a failure can be determined by a d e f i n i t e  r o l l  toward 
t h e  s ide  of t h e  f a i l e d  bag. If t h e  center  bag f a i l s ,  t h e r e  i s  no r o l l ;  
but t h e  command module does not upright within t h e  normal time o f  
7 minutes. Bag failures can a l s o  be detected by streams of  air bubbles 
5 
r i s i n g  near  the s i d e  windows. 
t e c t e d  because o f  t he  separate  loca t ions  - t h e  l e f t  side and t h e  
r i g h t  s i d e  of t h e  command module. When a compressor f a i l s ,  noise  
emits only from one s ide  of t h e  command module. 
t h e  a i r  compressors measured i n  the closed spacecraft var ied between 
96 and 99 decibels  reference 0.0002 microbar. 
t h e  threshold of pain (120 decibels  reference 0.0002 microbar) (ref. l ) ,  
it i s  i n  t h e  region of high annoyance andseverely impairs conversation, 
Compressor f a i l u r e s  were r ead i ly  de- 
The sound pressure of 
Although t h i s  i s  below 
During t h e  nominal three-bag uprighting of t h e  postlanding- 
systems qua l i f i ca t ion  tes t  (a t  sea), t h e  crew noted tha t  a consider- 
able reduction of compressor noise occurred when t h e  command module 
reached approximately 90' p i t c h  a t t i t u d e .  .During la te r  one-bag f a i lu re -  
mode tests, t h i s  noise reduction occurred within 1 minute of t he  up- 
r i g h t i n g  sequence i n i t i a t i o n .  
approximately 20 decibels reference 0.0002 microbar and brings the  
cabin noise  down t o  a l e v e l  much more conducive t o  conversation, A l -  
though t h e  change i n  compressor noise appears t o  be r e l a t e d  t o  system 
backpressure, f u r t h e r  t e s t i n g  is  necessary t o  determine t h e  p rec i se  
cause. Testing might a l s o  determine t h e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  and f e a s i b i l i t y  
of maintaining only t h e  lower noise  l e v e l  during upright ing f o r  reasons 
of crew comfort. 
This reduction i s  estimated t o  be 
Crew reposit ion.-  The one-bag failure-mode tests with command 
module 007A demonstrated t h a t  uprighting was only marginal f o r  t h i s  
case. To ensure an uprighting with a. single-point failure, t h e  tech- 
nique of crew reposi t ion was developed. 
more crewnen must move from t h e  crew much t o  a posi t ion which causes 
a favorable center-of-gravity shif 't  and thereby e f f e c t s  an uprighting. 
When two crewmen repos i t i on ,  t h e  change i n  t h e  command module center  of 
g rav i ty  can be as great  as 1 inch which i s  a s i g n i f i c a n t  change. Crew 
sa fe ty  was of msjor concern i n  t h e  technique development. 
varying magnitude can be imparted t o  t h e  crewman, depending upon t h e  
locat ion of h i s  reposit ioning. "he c lose r  t h e  crewman i s  located t o  
the  pivot point of t he  uprighting, t h e  less w i l l  be h i s  motion. 
determined tha t  a crewman wearing a pressure-garment assembly with i t s  
l a r g e  neck r i n g  and bulky f a b r i c  i s  adequately protected during h i s  
reposi t ion movement except when he i s  caught i n  a head-down a t t i t u d e  
during uprighting. A t  t h e  completion of t h e  uprighting, t he  crewman 
should be s i t t i n g  i n  the  lower equipment bay o r  l y ing  on t h e  a f t  bulk- 
head. It is  highly des i r ab le  f o r  t he  crewman i n  motion t o  know the  
moment when t h e  command module begins t o  upright.  This helps t h e  crew- 
tempted after complete bag i n f l a t i o n  because a one-bag failure does not 
preclude an uprighting. 
f a m i l i a r i t y  w i t h  uprighting and crew repos i t i on  t o  ensure crew safety.  
In t h i s  technique, one o r  
Motions of 
It was 
t o  avoid a head-down a t t i t u d e .  Repositioning should only be at- 
Operational crew t r a i n i n g  can provide s u f f i c i e n t  
6 
Uprighting tes t s  with bo i l e rp l a t e  29 and command module 007A have 
shown t h a t ,  unless  t h e  f a i l e d  bag i s  shut  down i n  an open-line bag 
f a i l u r e ,  t h e  remaining hags i n f l a t e  a t  a slower rate and do not  com- 
p l e t e ly  i n f l a t e .  
shut down as soon as t h e  f a i l u r e  is recognized. The crew can determine 
when t h e  remaining bags are i n f l a t e d  by l i s t e n i n g  f o r  t h e  bag re l ief  
valves which produce a gurgl ing noise  when unseated. The center  bag 
which has t h e  smaller  diameter i s  t h e  f irst  t o  f u l l y  i n f l a t e .  When a 
crewman recognizes a r e l i e f  valve unseat ing,  he can t u r n  of f  t h a t  bag, 
thereby increas ing  t h e  i n f l a t i o n  rate of  t h e  remaining bags. 
To el iminate  t h i s  problem, t h e  f a i l e d  bag should be 
During t h e  development of t h e  repos i t ion ing  technique, t h e  crewman 
had t o  be ab le  t o  re la te  a given bag switch t o  a p a r t i c u l a r  bag t o  
f a c i l i t a t e  the  shut t ing  down of a faLled bag o r  a completely i n f l a t e d  
bag. A t  t h a t  t i m e ,  t h e  upright ing bag switches were numbered one, two, 
and th ree  which d id  not re la te  a switch t o  a bag. 
spacecraf t  switch nomenclature was requested -from numerals t o  l e f t ,  
r i g h t ,  and center  of  L ,  R ,  and C. This change, which would adequately 
r e l a t e  a switch t o  a bag, was accepted and made t o  command module 1 0 1  
and subsequent command modules. 
A change t o  t h e  
Hatches 
The changes i n  t h e  Block I1 s ide  crew hatch have enhanced a safe 
and rap id  egress  capabi l i ty .  Emergency egress times have been cut 
from approximately 2 minutes Lo less than h a l f  a minute. With crewmen 
now reenter ing  without. pressure garments, egress  r a p i d i t y  h a s  probably 
been maximized f o r  postlanding. 
s t r u c t u r a l  changes could fu r the r  reduce t h e  egress time. 
Only an explosive hatch o r  major 
Only one minor problem, which was r e l a t e d  t c  t h e  s ide  ha tch ,  arose 
during t h e  water-egress-procedures developmental t e s t  series. 
was the  acc identa l  unstowing of  t h e  extravehicular  a c t i v i t y  (EVA)  
D-ring. The EVA D-ring i s  a t tached t o  a l i n e  and is  used from t h e  
in s ide  of t h e  command module t o  unlatch and t o  c loce t h e  s i d e  hatch 
t o  prevent exposing t h e  crewman t o  s o l a r  r ad ia t ion ,  The D-ring i s  
normally stowed i n  a machined piece of  Teflon. 
stowings, t h e  Teflon becomes .. *etched and does not  a k q u a t e l y  hold 
t h e  D-ring. 
opened by using t h e  counterbalance, t h e  D-ring came unstowed and caught 
on t h e  inner  l i p  of t h e  hatch frame. 
only approximately T O 0 .  
t h e  hatch inboard and by re leas ing  the  D-ring. 
gency, t h i s  COG 
This 
After seve ra l  un- 
Several  times during tes t s ,  when t h e  s ide  hatch was 
This permitted t h e  hatch t o  open 
The s i t u a t i o n  i s  e a s i l y  remedieC 3y pu l l ing  
However, i n  an emer- 
cut  valuable seconds from egress t i m e .  
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The s i g n i f i c a n t  difference i n  t h e  forward hatches of cordand 
module 101 and t h e  un i f i ed  forward hatch of command 103 necess i t a t ed  
t e s t i n g  w i t h  both configurations.  Two forward hatches were used i n .  
command module 101 - t h e  ab la t ive  hatch (50 l b )  a t  t h e  outer  extreme 
of t h e  command module tunnel  and t h e  pressure hatch (28 l b )  a t  t h e  
inner extreme of t h e  command module tunnel  ( f i g s .  j-1 and 5 ) .  
dir ' f icul ty  was encountered i n  t h e  unlatching of t hese  hacches. 
unstowing t h e  handle, t h e  crewman had t o  r o t a t e  t h e  handle while de- 
pressing a lockout button with h i s  thumb. On t h e  ab la t ive  hatch (where 
movement i s  r e s t r i c t e d  because of t h e  tunnel diameter and pressure- 
garment bulkiness)  , unlatching w a s  a problem, e spec ia l ly  f o r  t h e  small- 
handed crewman. 
emergency Stable  I1 egress , both hands could be used f o r  t h e  unlatching, 
and t h e  hatch simply could be permitted t o  s ink ( f i g .  6 ) .  
S me 
After 
Because t h i s  hatch i s  only removed i n  t h e  event of an 
Emergency Stable  I1 egress is  performed by flooding t h e  tunnel  a r e s ,  
by removing t h e  ab la t ive  hatch,  and by e x i t i n g  through t h e  tunnel  and 
up t o  t h e  surface of t h e  water. 
pressure across t h e  hatch t o  permit a sa fe  remciral of t h e  hatch. The 
command module 101 configured forward ab la t ive  hatch d i d  not contain a 
dump valve. To flood t h e  tunnel  on command module 101, it would have 
been necessary t o  open t h e  postlanding v e n t i l a t i o n  valves on t h e  upper 
deck. A t es t  was defined and performed t o  determine i f  t he  command 
module 101 forward hatches could be opened against  6 f e e t  of water 
pressure i n  t h e  event of a postlanding ventilation-valve f a i l u r e .  
data were obtained on t h e  torque needed t o  open these hatches against  
a waterhead. The la t te r  da t a  were used t o  adjust  t h e  operating force 
of t ne  mockup hatches i n  t h e  water-egress t r a i n e r ,  b o i l e r p l a t e  1102A. 
Results showed t h a t  t he  operating torque of t h e  ab la t ive  hatch w i t h  a 
6-foot waterhead was 93 inch-pounds - w e l l  within the spec i f i ca t ion  
maximum of 175 inch-pounds. The pressure hatch required 93 inch-pounds 
under i d e n t i c a l  conditions - w e l l  wi th i r ,  i t s  150-inch-pound spec i f i ed  
maximum. 
Flooding t h e  tunnel equalizes t h e  
Also, 
A s ing le  forward unif ied hatch has been adopted t o  command 
module 103 and subsequent command modules. This hatch i s  a combination 
of t h e  command modulo 101 ab la t ive  and pressure hatches. 
a t ion  of t h e  hatch is  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  of t h e  s i d e  crew hatch which i s  
operated by using a gearbox and a r a t che t ing  handle. The s ing le  for- 
w a r d  un i f i ed  hatch weighs approximately 81 pounds and includes a 
pressure equal izat ion valve. A t e s t  was defined which constrained t h e  
Apol!-o 8 m i s s i r n  t o  qua l i fy  t h i s  unif ied hatch f o r  a Stable  I1 egress.  
m e  increase i n  hatch weight and bulkiness suggested t h a t  a crewman 
might experience excessive d i f f i c u l t y  i n  l i f t i n g  and stowing t h e  'latch 
f r 3 m  t h e  tunnel while su i t ed  i n  an i n t eg ra t ed  thermal meteoroid garment. 
Test, results showed t h a t  t he  hatch,  with i t s  long unlatching handle 
and short  s t roke ,  i s  s ign i f i can t ly  e a s i e r  t o  unlatch underwater than 
The oper- 
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the  comand module 101 configured hatch. Because t h e  hatch i s  under wa- 
t e r  while inside t h e  t u n n e l ,  i t s  weight i s  reduced t o  29 pounds and can be 
e a s i l y  l i f t e d .  A t  t h e  top of t he  tunnel ,  some in t e r f e rence  i s  encountered 
with t h e  oxygen umbilicals which protrude s l i g h t i y  i n t o  t h e  tunnel  enve- 
lope. However, by s l i g h t l y  t i l t i n g  the  hatch,  it can be l i f t e d  past  t he  
unb i l i ca l s .  Outside the  tunnel,  t h e  hatch can be r o l l e d  and stowed i n  the  
aft equipnent bay next t a  t h e  couch of t h e  Lunar Module P i l o t .  If nec- 
essary,  a second crewman can a i d  i n  t h e  hatch removal. "he w a t e r  l e v e l  
inside the  tunnel w a s  approximately 3 inches lover  than when t h e  post- 
landing ven t i l a t ion  valves were used t o  flood t h e  t -amel .  The hatch w a s  
demonstrated t o  be adequate f o r  t h i s  mode of egress; and t h e  f l i g h t  con- 
s t r a i n t  f o r  t h e  second manned mission was l i f t e d  ( f i g .  1). 
Couches 
m e  couches used i n  cornand module 101  d i f f e r  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  from 
those of subsequent command modules. Both configurations were t e s t e d ,  
and evaluations vere nade concerning crew comfort during a 48-hour 
postlanding period and concerning couch in t e r f e rence  during egress.  
The 48-hour command module 007A- sea  tes t  demonstrated t h e  adequacy 
of t h e  command module 101 un i t i zed  hard couch. 
comfort w a s  enhanced by placing all three sea t  pa- . i n  t h e  180° posi t ion 
and by using panels o r  stowage boxes t o  extend t h e  couch t o  the aft 
equipment-bay w a l l  f o r  lower l e g  support. With t h e  foldable  keadrest ,  
these couches allowed some mobili ty i n  t h e  area between the  head of t h e  
couches and the  s ide  hatch. "he couch s t r u t s  did cut  down on crew 
d o b i l i t y  during egress by forcing t h e  two s i d e  crewmen t o  move to t h e  
center couch t o  egress from t h e  s i d e  hatch. 
During t h e  t e s t ,  couch 
The foldable crew couch, which i s  on cornand modules subsequent 
t o  command module 101, w a s  evaluated i n  a series of tests with t h e  
egress t r a i n e r  b o i l e r p l a t e  1102A. 
were s ign i f i can t ly  e a s i e r  t o  operate than the  un i t i zed  set flown on 
cmmand module 101. 
a r e  approximately equal,  t h e  individual  foldable  couch is s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
l i g h t e r  and thereby e a s i e r  t o  handle. This i s  apparent i n  t h e  seat pan 
of t he  uni t ized couch which is d i f f i c u l t  t o  operate i n  one g because 
of i t s  weight. 
Testing indicatzd t h a t  t hese  couches 
Although t h e  t .otal  weight of t h e  s e t s  of couches 
The nonstovable headrest and protruding frame of che foldable  
couch s ign i f i can t ly  reduce t h e  working a rea  available between t h e  head 
o f  t he  couch and t h e  s ide  crew hatch. Even t h e  crewman without a 
pressure-garment assemblj- f inds it d i f f i c u l t  t o  stand i n  t h i s  area t o  
remove t h e  side-hatch dump valve f o r  grappling hook deployment and 
f o r  ncrmal hatch opening. 
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The c y c l i c  s t r u t s  developd. f o r  csmand module 103 and t h e  sub- 
sequent command modules include a locirout device which i s  unlocked on 
main chutes. Ekcause 2f tile LlAki:?ess  ~f th? IGckmt device,  questions 
have a r i s e n  as t o  possible  egress i r i t i r fe rence .  Although any in t e r -  
ference i s  thought t o  be r s i E : k a L ,  rri>Gup m i t s  have been ordered; and 
tes ts  w i l l  be i n i t i a t e d  t o  evaluate e ~ e s s  envelope in te r fe rence .  
SWitciies and Ci rcu i t  3realrera 
T e s t i n g  i n  b o i l e r p l a t e  i lO2k and command module 007A has shown t h a t  
t h e  center (Command Module P i l o t )  right-hand (Lunar Module P i l o t )  
crewmen are &able t o  reach t h z  ‘iFrig?iTing bag switches when strapped 
i n  t h e i r  couches. Bowever, crew reposi t ion tes t s  have demonstrated 
t h e  capab i l i t y  of a crewman t o  cont ro l  h i s  x v e n e n t s  i n s ide  a spacecraft 
i n  nominal sea states (3 t o  5 ft). Beca..,e ;.-entry i s  no6 Serformed 
without pressure gaments ,  a crewman has t::e 7 3 b i l i t y  ar.d capab i l i t y  
t o  unstrap,  t o  move across t h e  spscec ra f t ,  and t; operate t h e  upright ing 
system while ir, t h e  S tab le  11 a t t i t u d e .  
Postlanding cabin l i g h t i n g  is  supylied by tvo f lood l igh t s .  One 
f lood l igh t  i s  located a.bove t h e  head o f  t h e  Comander near t h e  rendez- 
vous window; t h e  o ther  f loo3l igi i t  i s  located at t h e  head of t h e  crew 
couches between t h e  Commvlder a n d  t he  Cormand Module Pilot . .  These 
l i g h t s  provide exce l len t  i l l u n i n a t i o n  f o r  t h e  majority of postlanding 
switches, namely t h e  main d isp lay  console p a e l s  numbers 8 and 15. 
Only one of t h e  ereas containing t2e  :iast,I.sr.iinp c i rc l i i t  breakers 
i s  poorly i l luminated. This is  par,el nuriser 250 which i s  loca t ed  i n  
t h e  lower right-hand equipment bay znd contains t h e  following c i r c u i t  
breakers : c i r c u i t  breaker pyrotechnic A seq:ience A , c i r c u i t  breaker 
pyrotechnic B sequence B ,  b a t t e r y  A p o w r  e a t r y  and postlanding, bat- 
t e r y  B power en t ry  w.d postlanding, a r ~ d  b a t t e r y  C power en t ry  and 
postlanding (appendixes A and B). Although i l luminat ion i n  t h i s  area 
with t h e s e  c i r c u i t  breakers t o  know t h e i r  l oca t ion ,  o r  t h e  f l i g h t  
penlights may be used t o  overcome d i f f i c u l t i e s .  
. is poor, it i s  f e l t  t h a t  t h e  appyopriate crewman i s  f ami l i a r  enough 
Pr ior  t o  t h e  Apollo 8 mission, two t e s t s  were conducted t o  deter-  
mine problem areas associated with night egress .  
S tab le  I1 emergency egresses were performed from b o i l e r p l a t e  1102A 
i n  t h e  test tank f a c i l i t y .  kL1 building l i g h t s  were turned o f f .  
Both S tab le  I and 
The Stable  I tes t  demonstrated t h e  adequacy o f  t he  cabin l i g h t i n g  
f o r  emergency night egress .  S l igh t  probisns were encountered when 
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deploying t h e  ra f t  and when egressing i n t o  t h e  raf t  because of l o s s  of  
night  v i s ion  when looking back i n t o  t h e  cabin. Cabin penl ights  were 
usefu l  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  raf t  deployment and ra f t  ingressing. A penl ight  
taped t o  t h e  s ide  hatch would ai? t h e  crewmen when e n t e r i i g  t h e  ra f t  
and when observing hatch movement. 
The Stab le  I1 t e s t  demonstrated t h e  ..dequecy of  cabin l i g h t i n g  
fo r  t h i s  mode. The crew d id  obtain some minimal l i g h t i n g  on t h e  sur- 
face from cabin l i g h t i n g  through spacecraf t  windows. However, it was 
determined t h a t  penl ights  are necessary f o r  raft deployment. 
recommended t h a t  penl ights  be taped t o  t h e  w r i s t  of  t h e  crewmen t o  
preclude l o s s  of  t h e  penl ights  during sur fac ing  and raft i n f l a t i o n .  
It w a s  
Handholds 
Except f o r  t h e  tendency of  t h e  handholds on t h e  lower edge of t h e  
main display console t o  pinch f inge r s ,  a l l  o the r  handholds are suf-  
f i c i e n t  f o r  postlanding crew movement. Although no handholds are 
loca ted  i n  t h e  lower equipment bay and a f t  stowage area, crew re- 
pos i t ion  f o r  upright ing w a s  r ead i ly  performed by using t h e  z-z s t r u t s  
as handholds , when necessary. 
Postlanding Vent i la t ion  
Command module 007A was used f o r  qua l i f i ca t ion  tests of t h e  post- 
landing ven t i l a t ion  system. 
Apollo environmental t es t  chamber f o r  t h e  design l i m i t  case.  Specif ic  
t e s t  r e s u l t s  are ava i lab le  i n  t h e  Landing and Recovery Division System 
Test Report 68-219. 
landing ven t i l a t ion  system i n  maintaining a habi tab le  environment 
throughout t h e  postlanding phase of a mission. 
Tests  were conducted at  sea and i n  the  
The tes t s  demonstrated t h e  adequacy of t h e  post- 
The f i r s t  two manned missions have demonstrated t h e  need f o r  a 
Fol- change i n  procedure i r r  t h e  postlanding ven t i l a t ion  operation. 
lowing both missions,  t h e  ven t i l a t ion  valves were left  open a f t e r  
powerdown and af ter  crew egress  because t h e  main power c i r c u i t  breakers 
were pul led before  &he ventJlation switch was turned o f f .  
l a t i o n  valves are motor d r i r en  and requi re  a current  pu lse  t o  c lose.  
procedure should c a l l  out t h e  c los ing  of t h e  ven t i l a t ion  valves before  
powerdown. "his problem was pointed out t o  t h e  Apollo 9 f l i g h t  crew 
i n  a premission recovery briefifig.  Tests with b o i l e r p l a t e  1102A and 
command module OO7A and nis -*on r e s u l t s  have shown t h a t ,  following 
and 4. 
The venti-  
"he 
an upright ing,  sea water i s  % apped on t h e  upper deck between gussets  3 
When postlanding ven t i l a t ion  valves are o w e d ,  t h i s  water dra ins  
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through t h e  valve openings and i s  e i t h e r  blown on t h e  crew through t h e  
i n l e t  valve o r  runs down t h e  rear of t h e  main display console through 
t h e  exhaust valve. Although t h e  quant i ty  i s  small, t h e  problem of 
salt water corrosion could compromke cabin components f o r  future reuse.  
A new type of couch s t r u t  has been i n s t a l l e d  on command module 103 
and subsequent command modules which incorporates a lockout device. 
This device i s  !mated on t h e  plus-2 side of t h e  s t r u t s  and does not 
appear t o  pose any r e s t r i c t i o n  t o  comand module egress .  However, 
because t h e  right-hand x-x head s t r u t  i n t e r f aces  w i t h  postlanding- 
v e n t i l a t i o n  blower ducts , t h e  addi t ion of the  lockout device compresses 
t h e  center  duct k d  appears t o  r e s t r i c t  flow. 
the s t rut  change t o  postlanding-ventilation flow rates has not y e t  been 
determined. The use of duct extensions has been shown t o  a id  t h e  
cooling e f f e c t s  of t h e  postlanding fan.  
ducts beneath the  Commander’s couch appears inappropriate.  Because 
the  ducts are necessary only during periods of high heat load,  t h e  work 
needed t o  unstow and t o  connect t h e  ducts appears t o  p a r t i a l l y  defeat  
t h e  purpose of t h e  ducts. 
t o  the molded fan duct (as i n  Block I )  should be reevaluated. 
The s p e c i f i c  e f f e c t  of 
However, stowage of t h e s e  t h r e e  
The p o s s i b i l i t y  of a t t ach ing  the  extensions 
Sea Water Pump 
During t h e  postlanding-systems qua l i f i ca t ion  tests with comand 
module 007A, 
plug w a s  removed f o r  i n s e r t i o n  of t h e  s e a  water pump. 
module 007A had a Block I configured steam-vent l i n e ,  a test w a s  de- 
f ined  by using a Block I1 configured steam-vent l i n e  t o  determine 
whether t h e  sea water pump w a s  needed f o r  water ingestion. 
showed t h a t ,  even i n  moderate sea states, water co l l ec t ed  i n  t h e  Block I1 
steam-vent l i n e .  
bag without t h e  use of t h e  s e a  water pump. 
water gushed *om t h e  steam-vent l i n e  when t h e  steam-vent 
Because command 
Test r e s u l t s  
“his water was e a s i l y  t r a n s f e r r e d  i n t o  t h e  desa l t i ng  
During egress t r a i n i n g  of t h e  Apollo 7 f l ight  crew, an a l t e r n a t e  
means of deploying t h e  sea water pump w a s  demonstrated. By opening t h e  
side-hatch dump -Jalve, t h e  pump l i n e  can be deployed between the  valve 
and t h e  valve sea t .  The pump-line length i s  adequate t o  reach t h e  
water. 
usiilg t o o l  E t o  remove t h e  steam-vent-line access panel,  and using 
t o o l  B t o  remove t h e  steam-vent-line plug. 
valve provides an e a s i l y  accessible  penetration and r e l a t i v e l y  l a r g e  
working area; whereas t h e  working area beneath t h e  couches was confined. 
If t h e  sea water pump i s  r e t a ined  as a stowage item on t h e  spacecraf’t, 
it i s  recommended t h a t  it be used through 6he dump valve r a t h e r  than 
t h e  steam-vent duct. For f u r t h e r  information, see Landing and Recovery 
Division System Test Report 69-06. 
This method i s  much emier than moving beneath t h e  couches, 
Use of the  side-hatch dump 
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Grappling Hook 
The grappling hook i s  a device deployed through the  side-hatch 
dump valve t o  snag a l i n e  and t o  slow t h e  d r i f t  r a t e  of t h e  command 
module. Two problems were encountered i n  hook deployment during 
egress t r a i n i n g  exercises .  During removal of t h e  spacecraf t  d q  
valve,  t he  torque s e t  screws were extremely d i f f i c u l t  t o  withdraw; and 
i n  two cases,  t h e  heads of t h e  screws were s t r ipped ,  which prevented 
removal. This w a s  remedied by backing o f f  t h e  dump valve one o r  two 
turns  t o  reduce t h e  tension on t h e  Ezrews.  No problem has been en- 
countered when t h i s  procedure w a s  followed. The second problem in- 
volved the  "captive" screws on t h e  anchor p l a t e  of t h e  grappling hook. 
The anchor p l a t e  i s  mated t o  t h e  spacecraf t  by two screws a f t e r  removal 
of %lie dump valve. On two occasions,  when f l ight- i tem grappling hooks 
were used, one of t h e  capt ive screws dropped out of t h e  anchor p l a t e  
p r i o r  t o  spacecraft  attachment. It has not been determined whether 
loss of these screws w a s  caused by f a u l t y  design of t h e  washer r e t a i n e r ,  
improper handling, o r  excessive use of t h e  hooks. 
Egress 
Because of command module changes from Block I t o  Block 11, an 
egress-procedures-verification t e s t  s e r i e s  w a s  conducted, as i n  Block I 
( r e f .  2 ) .  
w i t h  differences r e l a t i n g  mainly t o  t h e  opening of t h e  new unif ied s ide  
hatch. Stable  I1 egress w a s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a l t e r e d  by removal of t he  
postlanding v e n t i l a t i o n  valves from the  forward hatch i n  Block I t o  t h e  
upper deck on Block 11, by t h e  inclusion of t h e  double forward hatch 
on command module 101, and by inclusion of t h e  forward un i f i ed  hatch 
w i t h  i n t eg ra t ed  pressure equal izat ion valve on command module 103 and 
subsequent command modules ( f i g s .  7 t o  10). 
Stable  I egress remained e s s e n t i a l l y  the  same as i n  Block I 
Although Stable I and Stable  I1 egress procedures had been inves t i -  
gated and v e r i f i e d ,  questions remained concerning t h e  procedure t o  be 
used i n  t h e  case of a p a r t i a l l y  uprighted spacecraf t .  
were FerfOITfIed (by using b o i l e r p l a t e  29A) t o  determine t h e  pos i t i on  of 
spacecraft  hatches i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  water l e v e l s .  In each t e s t ,  only 
one bag was i n f l a t e d .  Photographs show t h a t  a Stable  I1 egress i s  
necessary i f  only t h e  z-bag i n f l a t e s  because t h e  s ide  hatch remains 
below the  water l e v e l .  However, i n  t he  case of a s i n g l e  y-bag in- 
f l a t i o n ,  it appears t h a t  a s i d e  crew-hatch egress could be performed 
because i n  t h i s  case,  t h e  s i d e  hatch i s  above the  water l ine.  Some 
questions remain as t o  whether an uprighting can be e f f ec t ed  with one 
i n f l a t e d  y-bag and with th ree  crewmen reposi t ioning.  
would c l a r i f y  these  questions and would determine whether two o r  t h ree  
Several  t e s t s  
Further t e s t s  
13 
modes of egress are necessary. 
tude is shown i n  figure 11. 
The b o i l e r p l a t e  29A single-bag att i-  
During egress  t e s t i n g ,  f l ight-configured su rv iva l  k i t s  were used. 
These k i t s  contain su rv iva l  items such as water, f l a sh ing  l i g h t ,  sun- 
g las ses ,  raf't , r ad io ,  sunbonnet, s i g n a l  mirror, f i sh ing  apparatus,  and 
knife. Some d i f f i c u l t i e s  were encountered with lanyard entanglement. 
This problem is fe l t  t o  be one of crew inexperience and not a design 
deficiency of the  su rv iva l  equipment system. Another problem involving 
l o s s  of carbon dioxide during raft and l i f e v e s t  i n f l a t i o n  w a s  r e c t i f i e d  
by a design change i n  t h e  carbon dioxide cyl inder  plunger-inflation 
mechanism. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The Apollo postlanding i n t e r f a c e  between man and machine has been 
The crew reposi t ioning technique 
tested and has been demonstrated t o  be adequate. Uprighting system 
failures are detectable  by the crew. 
has been demonstrated t o  be safe and has shown that  t h e  crewmen are 
cepable of con t ro l l i ng  t h e i r  motions i n  a dynamic command module. Crew- 
men i n  the  process of reposi t ioning should be warned when the  spacecraf t  
begins t o  upright.  
No s i g n i f i c a n t  problems were encountered with the  hatches. I n  
ramoving the dump valve f o r  grappling hook deployment, it i s  advisable 
t o  back o f f  the  valve one o r  two tu rns  t o  ease the tension on the  
screws. 
Foldable couches were more e a s i l y  operated than t h e  un i t i zed  
couch of command module 101; t he  comfort l e v e l  w a s  e q u d .  
of the  foldable  couch frame toward the s i d e  hatch r e s t r i c t s  movement 
near the  hatch. 
ference problems - egress o r  postlanding v e n t i l a t i o n  - caused by 
the new cyc l i c  s t r u t  lockout devices. 
Protrusion 
Further t e s t i n g  is  necessary t o  determine any i n t e r -  
Several  postlanding switches are inaccessible  t o  t h e  crewmen 
when they are strapped i n  t he i r  couches. However, crew repos i t i on  
tests demonstrated the crew's mobili ty and capab i l i t y  t o  con t ro l  
movement i n  a dynamic s i t u a t i o n .  
Cabin l i g h t i n g  i s  excel lent  f o r  night  i n t e r i o r  s igh t .  F l i g h t  
penlights shduld be made available f o r  possible  nighttime egresses ,  
The sea water pump is not needed to obtain sea water when main- 
taining cabin integrity because the steam-vent duct acts as a water 
trap. However, if it is used, the cabin ventilation valve in the side 
hatch is a more accessible opening. 
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Nominal water landing 
(harness on) 
Post landing 
c i r c u i t  breaker 
APPENDIX A 
Worst -cas e 
land landing 
(harness on) 
ACCESSIBILITY OF POSTLANDING SWITCHES AND 
C I R C U I T  BIlEAKXRS 
The following t a b l e  l i s t s  t h e  p s t l a n d i n g  switches and c i r c u i t  
breakers and t h e i r  a c c e s s i b i l i t y  t o  t h e  crewmen f o r  both a worst-case 
land landing (50 f t / s e c  horizontal  ve loc i ty  - x-struts  s t roke approxi- 
mately 11 inches. and z-s t ruts  s t roke approximately 17 inches)  and a 
naminal water landing. The t e s t  subject  w a s  5 feet 7 inches t a l l  arid 




CB - M A I N  REL PYRO 
SECS PYRO 
SECS LOGIC 
CB BAT RELAY BUS 
DIRECT O2 
VHF AM B 
FLOAT BAG - (3  ) 
CB PL VENT 
CB FLOAT BAG 
VHF AM BCN 
VHF AM A 
PL VENT LOCK HANDLE 
PL VENT SWITCH 

















Crew- Ac ce s s i b ilit y 





















Access ib i l i ty  













Imp0 s s i b l e  
Easy 
a 
bLunar Module P i l o t .  
Commander. 
Command Module P i l o t .  C 
29 
CB MNB BAT BUS B AND EAT C 
CB FLT AND PL BAT C 
CB PYRO A SEQ A . 
CB PYRO B SEQ B 
CB FLT AND PL BAT BUS A 
A N D E  
CB FLT AND PL BAT C 
PL BCN LT 
PL DYE MARKER 
VHF ANT - RECY 
PL FIXED FLOOD 






I I I I 
LMP LMP Easy 
LMP I;..> Easy 
LMP LMP Impossible 
LMP LMP Impossible 
LMP LMP Easy 
LMP LMP Easy 
CDR CDR Impossible 
CDR CDR Impossible 
LKP LMP Impossible 
CDR CDR Easb 
LMP LMP Impossible 


























POSTLANDING AND WATER EGRESS 
1. S t a b i l i z a t i o n  a f te r  landing 
ELS - AUTO ( v e r i f y ) .  
CB MAIN REL PYRO (both) - CLOSE 
MAIN RELEASE - on (up) 
SECS PYRO (both)  - SAFE 
SECS LOGIC (both) - OFF 
CB BAT RLY BUS (2)  - OPEN 
Helmet off  ( i f  s u i t e d )  
DIRECT O2 - CLOSE (CW) ( i f  s u i t e d )  
VHF AM B - OFF (cen te r )  
CB PL VENT - CLOSE 
CB FLOAT BAG (3) - CLOSE 
If Stable I1 
FLOAT BAG (3) - FILL till 2 min a f t e r  
upright ,  then - OFF 
VHF AM A - OFF while inverted 
VHP AM BCN - OFF while inverted 
If Stable  I 
After  10 min cooling period, 
FLOAT BAG ( 3 )  - FILL 7 mia 






2. Post S t a b i l i z a t i o n  and Vent i la t ion 
PL Vent v l v  ba2dle - PULL 
Remove PL ven; exhaust cover 
PL Vent - High o r  Low 
Release r e s t r a i n t s  (if s u i t e d )  
CB MNA BAT BUS A and BAT C ( 2 )  - OPEN 
CB MNB BAT BUS B and BAT C ( 2 )  - OPEN 
CB PYRO A SEQ A - OPEIT 
PL DYE MARKER - ON 
27 5 
CB FLT and PL BAT C - OPEN 
250 
















EACH HR - CHECK DC VOLTS 27.5 V 
CB FLT and PL BAT BUS A AND B ( 2 )  - OPEN 
CB FLT and PL VAT C - CLOSE 
If Not: 
GO TO LOW POWER CHECKLIST pg 2 
Unstow and i n s t a l l  POSTLANDING 
VENTILATION DI€JICTIONAL 
AIRFLOW DUCT 
Deploy grappling hook and l i n e  i f  req. 
3. Postlanding Communications 
VHF ANT - RECY (verif'y) 
VHF BCN - ON (ve r i fy )  
If no contact; with recovery forces  
MONITOR VHF BEACON Transmission 
with Survival Transceiver 
VHF Beacon not operating - 
connect Survival Transceiver t o  ANT 
Cable and place radio i n  BCN mode 
LOW POWER . CHECKLIST 
Panel  
. 3  
VHF BCN - O F F  3 
VHF ( 3 )  - RCV 
FLOOD FIXED - OFF 8 
VHF AM B of f  (center )  
VHF AM REC ONLY - A (ver i fy)  3 
COUCH LIGHTS - OFF 8 $ 5  
POSTLANDING MJT SYS: minimize w e  a 
SURV RADIO - plug i n t o  VHF BCN ANT cable 
COm and turn rad io  on i n  BCN mode 
. EGRESS PROCEDURES 
STABLE I 
Disconnect umbilicals ( i f  
Neck dams on ( i f  suited) 
Center couch - 270' pos i t  
Armrests folded 
Unstow survival rucksacks 
Open s ide  hatch 
PL Vent fan  - O F F  
su i ted  
on 















Connect raft t o  S/C, i f  desired,  with 
green lanyard 
Connect raft white lanyards t o  water 
. w i n g s  and i n f l a t e  water w h g s  when 
egressing 
Qress with liferaft 
-“ut hardware k i t  out 
Egress 
STABLE I1 
CB CREW STA AUDIO (3) - OPEN 
PWR ( 3 )  - CFF 
SUIT PMR (3)  - OFF- 
Discmnect umbilicals ( i f  s u i t e d )  
Release r e s t r a i n t s  ( i f  s u i t e d )  
Couch seat pans (3 )  - 170° pos i t i on  
Neck dams on ( i f  s u i t e d )  
A r m  rests folded 
Survival  k i t s  removed from stowage 
Connect l iferaft  mainline t o  CDR 
Connect first white lanyard from 
Connect second white lanyard f ron  
Connect t h i r d  white lanyard from 
liferaft. t o  w a t e r  wings 
l iferaft  t o  w a t e r  wings 
l i fe ra f t  t o  w a t e r  wings 
Remove and stow f w a  hatch 
Exi t  feet first with rucksacks; when 
PBESSURE EQUALIZATION VLV - OPEN 
c l e a r  of S/C i n f l a t e  w a t e r  wings and 
raft 
i n f l a t e  water wings 
i n f l a t e  w a t e r  wings 
E x i t  feet f i rs t ;  when clear of S/C 
Exit  feet firs+,; when clear of S/C 
